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Abstract: We propose an intergroup competition scheme (ICS) to solve the 
free-riding problem in the public goods game. Our solution only requires 
knowledge of the group contributions, is budget balanced and with the right 
parameters a dominant strategy.  The main innovations of our design are that 
the prize to the winning group is paid by the losing group and that the size of 
the transfer depends on the difference in contribution by the two groups. 
With the right parameters, this scheme changes the dominant strategy from 
none to full contribution. We tested different parameterizations for the ICS. 
The experiments show dramatic gains in efficiency in all the ICS treatments. 
Moreover, versions of the ICS in which intergroup competition should not 
change the zero contribution Nash equilibrium also produce remarkable gains 
in efficiency and no decline in contributions over time. 
 
JEL Classification code: H41, L22, C92 
 
Keywords: public goods, intergroup competition, team production, voluntary 
contributions mechanism, economic experiments. 
 
                                                 
* We are indebted to Robert Slonim, Glen Harrison, Che Xiao, and Stefan Palan for helpful comments. 
 
† Guillen (corresponding): Room 340, Merewether Building, Discipline of Economics, The University 




Free riding on the contribution to public goods is a well known economic issue. 
Samuelson (1954) was the first to describe this problem in mathematical terms. In 
order to overcome it, theorists have been proposing a variety of taxation schemes 
since the early 1970s, e.g. Clark (1971), Groves and Ledyard (1977) or Green and 
Laffont (1979). Experimental evidence hints that free riding is a somehow less acute 
problem than the theory suggests (Sweeny 1973; Marwell and Ames 1979; Andreoni 
1988). Experiments show subjects’ tendencies to behave in a conditionally 
cooperative manner (Keser and van Winden 2000). Typically, initial contributions in 
finitely repeated public goods games start substantially higher than zero (around 50 
percent of the individual endowment on average) but decline over time and approach 
zero in the last period. Gains on efficiency are significant with respect to the 
theoretical prediction but far from the social optimum. A few schemes manage to 
achieve degrees of efficiency closer to the social optimum. They rely, however, on 
participants having knowledge of their peers’ individual contributions Fehr and 
Gaechter (2000); or on an informed third party (Holmstrom 1982; Falkinger et al. 
2000). This is a serious shortcoming for the real-life implementation of such schemes 
in many salient applications. 
 
We propose a simple intergroup competition scheme (ICS) to solve free riding in a 
linear version of the public goods game, namely the well known voluntary 
contributions mechanism (VCM). The proposed intergroup competition (ICS) scheme 
has desirable properties. First of all the ICS requires little information as it is enough 
to only know the aggregate contributions of each of two groups.  Second, it is budget 
balanced. And third, as it is proportional to the difference in contributions, 
contributing fully becomes a dominant strategy with the right parameters. Moreover 
the ICS has the same good properties with some non-linear versions of the public 
goods game, more general than the VCM. 
 
The ICS works as follows. The difference between the aggregate contributions of two 
groups is multiplied by a parameter (δ). This product is subtracted from the payoff of 
each member of the low aggregate contribution group and added to the payoff of each member of the high aggregate contribution group. Thus, by increasing contribution to 
the public good by one unit, a player receives the marginal per capita return (MPCR) 
plus  δ. If the sum of the MPCR and δ is bigger than one, the efficient (full) 
contribution to the public good becomes a dominant strategy.  
 
The ICS design is most applicable to organisational settings involving team 
production in groups. Sales teams, technology firms, and maybe even automotive 
factories
1 can be examples of firms that could use such a design to increase 
productivity.
2 Similar applications could be used in energy saving initiatives where 
groups compete to save the most energy and a proportion of the savings is distributed 
to the participants of the group with the greatest savings from the group with the least. 
 
Our ICS design addresses the shortfalls of some incentivized tournaments proposeed 
to raise team performance (for examples see Lazear and Rosen 1981; Ehrenberg and 
Bognanno 1990). Tournament designs have the advantage of reducing the cost of 
providing the incentives by eliminating common shocks that affect agents’ 
performance. A drawback of these designs however is that the agents are only 
incentivised to reach effort levels marginally better than their opponent. For the 
winners, any effort beyond the winning threshold yields no additional return. Arce 
and Jerez (2009) show after analysing a sales contest organized by a commodity 
company that winning participants decrease their effort as their lead increases. 
Similarly, losing participants decreased their efforts when the gap became very large. 
 
Most of the literature on intergroup competition to date has examined competition 
under schemes where members of the winning team receive a bonus or reward. In 
contrast to our design, no transfer between the groups occurs under these schemes. 
Rapoport and Bornstein (1987) were the first to introduce an intergroup competition 
paradigm into social dilemmas by proposing a binary public goods game where two 
groups compete in aggregate contributions for a reward. The primary motivation for 
such games was to examine the effect of differing endowment sizes, group sizes and 
game structure on contributions in an environment of intergroup conflict (Rapoport, 
                                                 
1 Two factories producing the same car with the same techonology. 
2 Note that in theses contexts a principal may base an ICS on variables like output of sales rather than 
aggregate group contribution or aggregate group effort. Bornstein and Erev 1989; Bornstein, Erev and Goren 1994; Bornstein 2003). 
Intergroup conflict exacerbated inefficiencies in the Chicken game (Bornstein, 
Budescu and Zamir 1997) and intergroup competition was initially framed as an 
economic and societal problem to be examined. The possibility of exploiting 
intergroup competition to achieve socially efficient outcomes started to emerge 
experimentally with Borstein, Erev and Rosen (1990); Bornstein Gneezy and Nagel 
(2002); and Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006). Intergroup competition was shown 
to reduce free riding in social dilemma experiments and raise effort levels in a field 
study involving team production (Erev, Bornstein and Galil 1993). Still, all of these 
studies (and the theoretical literature of taxation and tournament schemes) use designs 
that rely on rewards that are funded by the experimenter. The additional cost of these 
rewards imposes a non-balanced budget and a loss of efficiency.  
 
The closet study to ours is one by Tan and Bolle (2007) who found that a awarding a 
higher MPCR of the public good to the winning group increased contributions under 
intergroup competition in the public goods game compared to no differentiation of 
MPCR. Their study consisted of fewer subjects with no treatments in which the 
parameters changed the Nash equilibrium to full contribution. Our study aims to 
directly test a transfer design in which the parameters change the Nash equilibrium to 
full contribution. We also test the performance of the ICS compared with a reward 
scheme with no transfer. Our no transfer reward scheme is similar to that of prior 
intergroup competition schemes mentioned above in that the reward is funded by the 
experimenter. Although it is also different in that the amount rewarded depends on 
the difference between the two groups, providing an incentive not to only win but to 
win by a larger amount. To assess the sensitivity of the ICS to changes in the 
parameters and separate the different motivations that might be driving the 
mechanism, we additionally test a weaker version of the ICS. 
 
The ICS can be also superior to a scheme in which group members are rewarded if 
the group output reaches a threshold. Note that with the right parameters this scheme 
would also generate an efficient solution through a dominant strategy. The ICS does 
not require setting a threshold and therefore it is not necessary to know how far a 
group can increase its productivity. 
 This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the ICS. Section 3 contains 
the experimental design. Section 4 summarises the results and section 5 concludes. 
An Appendix contains a sample of the experimental instructions. 
 
 
2. The intergroup competition scheme (ICS) 
We model a public goods situation using a standard Voluntary Contributions 
Mechanism (VCM) (see Davis and Holt 1993; Ledyard 1995). Participants are given 
the same endowment w so that each participant has the same budget. Participants 
interact in groups of N. Each individual has to decide how much of his endowment to 
allocate to a public account ti and how much to keep for himself w- ti. For each group, 
the sum of the individual allocations to the public good   is then multiplied by a 
factor a (where ), to model the additional value generated from the public 
nature of the good. The final value of the public account is then shared equally among 
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 under the assumptions of selfishness and common knowledge of perfect 
rationality, it is a dominant strategy for each individual to free ride, that is to allocate 
nothing to the public account. This is because the returns from the public account are 
shared equally and no individual receives the full return from their own investment. 
However, maximum efficiency is achieved when all members allocate their entire 
endowment i w ti ∀ = , . The VCM mechanism models the conflict between individual 
and group incentives.  
 
We propose the following Intergroup Competition Scheme (ICS) to solve the free 
rider problem. The mechanism involves competition between two groups where the 
prize to the winning group is funded by the losing group. Thus the mechanism works 
through a transfer from one group to another. Let us suppose two groups, denoted A 
and B, compete in aggregate allocations to the public account. The difference in 
aggregate allocations between the two groups is multiplied by a parameter δ. This product is then subtracted from the payoff of each member of the group with the 
lower aggregate contribution and added to each participant’s payoff in the group with 
the higher aggregate contribution. Participants still receive the MPCR from the public 
good but now also receive an additional return on the public account from the transfer 
parameter δ. formally, the payoff of member i belonging to group A can be described 
as: 
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Conversely, for member l of group B: 
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, then  (with k = A or B) is a dominant strategy under the 





of the contributions of the other team members, it will always be in an individual’s 
best interest to contribute fully to the public account. At the very least, an individual 
can always minimise their loses by contributing maximally. Under the ICS, even 
though the equilibrium yields max i π , it is still possible for participants to make losses 
out of equilibrium. 
 
The ICS is designed to work with the VCM, that is, a simple linear version of the 
public goods game. When generalising the ICS beyond a simple linear version some 
problems need to be taken into account. In the VCM, maximum efficiency is 
achieved when the whole endowment is allocated to the public good. A non linear 
version of the public goods game has, in general, an interior solution. That is, 
optimality is achieved by allocating a positive amount lower than the endowment. In 
this case, under the ICS, there is a risk of overshooting and therefore providing too 
much of the public good. Overshooting can be avoided and efficiency can still be 
                                                 
3 Under fairly general assumptions the scheme would also work for conditional cooperators.  achieved in a more general public goods environment. Consider for instance  the 
simplest of the Holmstrom (1982) team production models. In that model n 
individuals who take a costly non-observable action (that can be understood as a 
contribution to a public good)   with a private (nonmonetary) cost 
is strictly convex, differentiable and increasing with   Let 
. The actions taken by the n individuals determine a monetary 
outcome 
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, : ℜ → A x  that must be allocated among them. The function x should be 
strictly increasing, differentiable and concave with  . 0 ) 0 ( = x  Finally   is the 
share of agent i in the output. The preference function of agent i is supposed to be 
additively separable in money and action and linear in money. Holmstrom 
demonstrates the inexistence of Pareto efficient, budget balanced sharing rules.  
) (x si
 
In the Holmstrom model, efficiency can be achieved through intergroup competition. 
As earlier we assume there are two groups, A and B, with the same number of 
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share the output equally. The maximization problem for a member of group A is 
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Note that intergroup competition breaks budget balancing within each group but there 
is budget balancing when considering the two groups. There might be intergroup 
transfers in equilibrium but money does not exogenously enter or exit from outside of 
the two groups.   
Even if overshooting could be sometimes avoided in a general public goods context, 
if heterogeneity exits amongst agents, some agents could be worse off by 
participating in public good production or in a team effort task. In a team effort task, 
the participation constraint may have a positive effect as the agents who can obtain a 
benefit would self-select into the task. Note that the ICS entails the right incentives 
for the teams to improve in the long run by learning to perform better or by hiring 
better team members. In a similar vein, it may become unnecessary to know what the 
efficient provision to the public good (or to the team is). Hiring better team members 
would push the envelope of what can be achieved in the Pareto optimal situation, 
everyone always has the incentive to go the extra mile. 
 
 
3. Experimental design 
A total of 328 subjects (mainly undergraduates) participated in one of 14 
experimental sessions of a zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) computerized experiment 
conducted at the Behavioural Experimental Lab at the University of Sydney. The 
experimental lab seats 36 privately partitioned computer stations inhibiting 
communication and line of sight. Average individual earnings were $31.50 AUS for a 
1.5 hour long experiment.  
 
There were five conditions in our study, two controls and three treatments (see table 1 
for a summary of conditions). The main condition to test the performance of the ICS 
in raising contributions was IG1. This condition had parameters designed such that 
the Nash equilibrium was full contribution. The IG2 condition tests whether the same 
results of IG1 can be induced without a transfer. The IG3 condition tests the extent to 
which economic rationality is a motivator of the mechanism through a weakened 
transfer parameter. For simplicity in describing the conditions we denote α as the 
MPCR of the public good and δ equal the return from the inter-group transfer for 
every dollar contributed.  
  
Table 1: Summary of experimental conditions 
      
Marginal return  Payoff parameters 
 
Nash Equilibria: 
C1  Standard public Goods  α < 1  α =0.5    [ti=0] (contribute zero) 
C2  inter-group information 
only 
α < 1  α =0.5  δ  =0  [ti=0] (contribute zero) 
IG1 Inter-group  mechanism  α +  δ  >1  α =0.5  δ  =0.75  [ti=wi] (full contribution) 
IG2  No transfer design
e 
(bonus scheme) 






(one group full contribution) 
IG3  Weakened inter-group 
mechanism 
α +  δ <1  α =0.5  δ  =0.25  [ti=0] (contribute zero) 
e=transfer funded by the experimentalist 
 
There were two stages to the experiment. Two sets of instructions were given to 
subjects, one for stage one, given before the commencement of stage one and one for 
stage two given after the completion of stage one. The instructions carefully 
explained the experiment within a neutral frame and how subjects’ payoffs would be 
calculated using a formula and examples. After five minutes reading time the 
instructions were read allow and subjects were given an opportunity to ask questions. 
We took great care to make sure subjects understood the rules and payoff functions 
by making subjects answer three numerically rigorous control questions (see 
supplementary material for instructions and questions). Those requiring assistance 
were counselled privately. The experiment did not proceed until all subjects answered 
the questions correctly and we presume all subjects fully understood the experiment.   
 
In the first stage of our experiment, subjects played 10 rounds of a standard Public 
Goods Game (Marwell and Ames 1979; Isaac and Walker 1988; Ledyard 1995). In 
this standard game, subjects were anonymously matched into groups of four at the 
beginning of stage one and remained in the same group for the entire 10 rounds. 
Every round each subject was given an endowment of 100 cents in which they had to 
decide how much to keep and how much to contribute to a public project. At the end 
of each round, total contributions to the public project were multiplied by two and 
then shared equally between the members of the group. Subjects were given feedback on the total contributions made to the public project by their group and their 
calculated payoffs (for that round and in total) at the end of each round. All 
treatments began with this first stage standard Public Goods Game. 
 
In the second stage, subjects played 10 rounds of a modified treatment Public Goods 
Game in all treatments except C1 where stage two was identical to stage one. 
Subjects were re-matched into new groups at the beginning of stage two. The re-
matching was designed so that none of a subject’s group members from stage one 
would be in their new group. In all the conditions except C1, the subject’s group was 
also paired with another group at the beginning of stage two. The groups and group 
pairs remained the same for the entire 10 rounds. In stage two, all conditions except 
C1 were given additional information at the end of each round on the total 
contributions of their paired group. In the C2 condition, the comparative information 
was given but the individual payoffs were calculated the same way as in stage one. 
For the IG1-3 conditions however, the calculated payoffs depended on the difference 
in contributions between their own group and the other group they were paired with. 
In the IG1 condition, parameters were chosen so the marginal payoffs for contributing 
to the public project were greater than one, thus theoretically overcoming an 
individual’s disincentive to contribute. Subjects received an equal share of the return 
of the public project (as in stage one) however their payoff would also be increased or 
decreased by 75 percent (δ =0.75) of the difference in total contributions between 
their group and the group they are paired with. If their group contributed more (less) 
than the other, then their payoff would increase (decrease) by 75 percent of the 
difference in contributions. Only in the IG1 condition, was it possible to earn a 
negative income in a round. For this condition, any losses in a round was covered by 




The average subject contribution using independent group and group-pair 
contributions for C1 and C2 are 49.86 (s.d. 14.20) and 34.73 (s.d.11.74) respectively. 
In the absence of incentives, providing comparative contribution information to 
subjects lowered the proportion contributed by an average of 15 percent. The average contribution in the inter-group conditions IG1, IG2, IG3 were 80.90 (s.d.10.78), 64.03 
(s.d. 9.02) and 67.61 (s.d.13.69) respectively. Consistent with theoretical predictions, 
IG1 yielded the highest average contribution of all the conditions with an average 
more than double that of C2. However, average IG1 contributions did not quite reach 
the Nash prediction of 100 percent contribution. Interestingly, in conditions IG2 and 
IG3, where the Nash equilibrium is still zero, we observe a significant increase in 
average contributions. Median values for each condition were similar to the means 
and are reported in Table 2. 
 
The average contributions in each treatment condition are all significantly different 
from the control conditions C1 and C2 using the Mann Whitney test (Table 2). 
Significant differences between the conditions also exist, particularly IG1, indicating 
strong empirical support for the theoretical inter-group solution.  
 
Table 2. Mean, median contributions and Mann-Whitney tests using independent 
observations 
 Condition 
  C1 C2  IG1  IG2  IG3 
Mean  contribution  49.86  34.73 80.92 64.03 67.61 
Median  contribution  50.31  36.54 81.11 64.93 69.38 
Mann  Whitney  (p-val)        
C1  - 0.055*  0.0002***  0.0253**  0.0157** 
C2   -  0.0003***  0.0008***  0.0005*** 
IG1     -  0.0094***  0.0469** 
IG2       -  0.4414 
IG3       -  
 
When we analyse cooperative behaviour in the stage two game by grouping 
individuals into four main types
4 (Table 3), we make an interesting observation: that 
proportion of Weak co-operators is most affected (positively) by the introduction of 
intergroup competition. This leads to the question, are there some contributor types 
that are more (less) sensitive to incentives than others?  
                                                 
4 We define strong free riders as individuals who contribute on average between zero and 25 percent, 
weak free riders as having average contributions between 25.1 and 50 percent,  weak cooperators as 
having average contributions between 50.1 and 75 percent; strong cooperators as individuals who 
contribute on average between 75.1 to 100 percent. We do not use Kaser and van Winden’s (2000) 
definitions because they cannot be used to catagorize the entire set of contributors.  
Table 3. Percentage of free riding and co-operating individuals in each condition 
Condition  Strong free riders  Weak free riders  Weak co-operators  Strong co-operators 
C1  12.50  37.50 16.70 33.30 
C2 39.00  36.10  5.50  19.40 
IG1 1.4  9.7  73.6  15.3 
IG2  15.65  21.90 48.40 14.05 
IG3  11.15  18.05 47.20 23.60 
 
 
To answer this we needed to find out how persistent individual contribution 
preferences were under the different condition mechanisms (regression a) Table 4). 
We therefore regressed each subjects’ average stage two contribution (S2Cont) on 
their average stage one contribution (S1) along with condition dummies, the base 
being C1, and interaction terms (see Table 4).  
 
Table 4. Effect of an individual’s stage one contribution on stage two contributions 
and probability of contribution type change 
  a) S2Cont  (n=328)  b) Ctype (p=1) 
Constant 9.381 
(7.857) 
Constant -0.364  (0.393) 
S1 0.758*** 
(0.131) 




























  S1.T3 -0.357** 
(0.162) 
  
R-square 0.475     
Dependent variables: a)S2Cont= stage two average contribution of individual i. b) (logit) Ctype = 1 if 
an individual’s contribution type changed from game 1 to game 2, zero otherwise. 
 
The significantly negative coefficients of S1IG1 and S1IG2 imply that the transfer 
mechanism removes a lot of the dependence of stage one contributions on the second 
stage. No significant interaction effect is evident for the IG2 condition implying that 
bonuses are not enough to remove individuals’ prior contribution inclination. 
Regression b) in table 4 suggests that no particular contributor type was more 
sensitive to incentives than others. The significance of s1sc shows that strong co-
operators were less likely to change after incentives were introduced. This suggests 





The control conditions replicate the temporal results of earlier VCM experiments 
(Ledyard 1995) where mean contributions start between 40 to 60 percent of the 
endowment and decline to close to zero. This is evident from Figure 1. In contrast to 
our controls, inter-group competition in all three conditions halted the typical decay 
of contributions over time. Contribution decay was even halted in the weakened inter-
group condition IG3 where the dominant strategy of zero contribution was the same 
as the control conditions. A similar halting and reduction of decay in intergroup 
competition VCM treatments are observed in Gunnthordottir and Rapoport (2006) 
and Tan and Bolle (2007). A graph of the difference in group contributions over time 
for condition IG3 is also given to show the mild convergence towards the equilibrium 
prediction of a 100 percent difference in contributions between the two groups. 
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Figure 1. Mean contributions per period 
 
The second aspect of our temporal analysis concerns the percentage of non-
contributors over time. Non-contributors grew early in the control conditions and by 
the end of the game, nearly 80 percent of subjects in condition C1 contributed nothing 
(Figure 2).  In contrast to the control conditions, non-contributors remained low in the 
inter-group competition conditions until the last round, with the exception of the IG1 
condition where there was no increase in non-contributors in the final round. The IG1 
condition outperformed all the conditions with the lowest percentage of non-



















Figure 2. Percentage of non-contributors by period 
 
Next we examine the distribution of contributions over time for each of the five 
conditions. As expected, Figure 3 shows that the control conditions converge to a 
positively skewed, unimodal distribution. There is more spread in the contributions in 
periods one to 8 in the control conditions compared with the competition conditions. 
However, in the final two rounds the concentration of contributions quickly surpasses 
the competition treatments by falling to zero. Condition IG1 consistently displays a 
unimodal distribution in the opposite direction (full contribution). In the IG2 
condition, where the Nash equilibrium is for one team contribute fully and the other 
nothing, we observed a convergence to relevant bimodal distribution. In condition 
IG3, where the Nash equilibrium is to contribute nothing, the distribution is 
unimodally positively skewed towards full contribution until the last round where 
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Figure 3. Distribution of contributions over time 
 
 
Conditional and competitive behaviour 
To what extent do the effects of conditional cooperation and competitive inter-group 
behaviour explain the different results in each of the conditions? To investigate 
exactly what motivated an individual to change their contribution from one round to 
the next we performed a panel data analysis. A Hausman test (Prob>chi2 = 0.000) 
suggested that the individual effects were correlated with our regressors therefore 
fixed effects estimation was the appropriate estimator for our data (Table 5). In these 
regressions the dependent variable is the change in a subject’s contribution from the 
previous period (DCont). The significance of difference between own’s contribution 
an the average contributions of others (LDiff) in all regressions in table 5 provides 
strong evidence of conditional cooperation in all conditions. Contributions are 
adjusted downwards (upwards) if in the previous round, one contributed more (less) 
than the average contribution of her co-members in the previous period. The 
interaction term LDiff.IG2 suggests that conditional cooperation is slightly stronger 
in the IG2 condition compared with C2.   
 
The variable LGDiff estimates the marginal effect of winning (win sample) and 
losing (loss sample) in the previous round on an individual’s change in contribution. The coefficient can be interpreted as the average change in contribution for a one cent 
increase in the size of the difference between the aggregate group contributions. Our 
estimates show that a loss to the other group raised contributions in the next round. 
However, a win also had the effect of decreasing contributions in the next round. 
Losing though, did have a slightly bigger impact than winning.  This was true for all 
inter-group conditions (C1 not being an inter-group condition) except for IG1. In the 
IG1 condition, where the parameters make full contribution the Nash equilibrium, the 
negative effect of winning was significantly reversed. The parameterization was 
successful at stopping the downward adjustment of contributions from the winners. It 
is in the loss sample that the IG1 condition is primarily distinguished from the other 
treatments by significantly increasing the marginal effect of losing on raising 
contributions. These estimates suggest that success of the IG1 condition in raising 
contributions over the other conditions rests on its greater ability to motivate the 
members of losing teams to raise their level of contribution.   
Table 5: Fixed effects regressions of DCont 
  DCont of subject 









































+ Round dummies (output not reported) 
R-square 
(within) 
0.34 0.26 0.46 
DCont=current period contribution – previous period contribution; LDiff = previous round 
contribution – previous round average contribution of co-members; LGdiff = previous round difference 
between paired groups’ aggregate contributions (LDdiff for loss sample was multiplied by -1 so as to 
interpret the variable as the magnitude of the loss). Dummies for rounds two to 10 were added (output 
excluded).Win sample if own group’s contributions were greater than the other group in the previous 
round and Loss sample if otherwise.  Base condition for win and loss sample regressions is C2. 




This paper demonstrates that an ICS with the right parameters can successfully 
increase cooperation close to Pareto optimal levels in a linear public goods game. The 
mechanism under IG1 parameters successfully removed prior contribution inclination and outperformed the bonus scheme in raising cooperation. We further reveal that 
intergroup competition broadly has the effect of halting contribution decay over time. 
Conditional cooperation seems to be robust to the presence of intergroup competition 
and was confirmed in all treatments. Under an ICS, losing against another team 
motivated subjects to contribute more the next period. With the right parameters this 
effect can yield significantly higher aggregate contributions to public goods. 
 
Higher average contributions in IG1 when compared with IG3, demonstrate that 
subjects follow some economic rationality (cost-benefit considerations). The marginal 
return to contribution in IG1 is higher than in IG3. However in IG3 we observe 
average contributions levels of 70 percent of the endowment which is significantly 
higher than both the equilibrium prediction of zero and the average contributions in 
the C2 control treatment (35 percent). It is clear that competitive behaviour is driving 
at most of the results. One could argue that out of the 80 percent average contribution 
in IG1, 35 percent can be attributed to competitive motivations and only 10 percent 
can be attributed to rational considerations. 
 
Why the mean contribution in C2 was significantly lower than the mean contribution 
of the C1 condition is not clear. This result was slightly unexpected as we believed 
that if providing comparative information on aggregate group contributions had any 
effect on contributions at all, it would be positive. Figure 1 shows that average 
contributions in C2 were lower than C1 even in the first round. Contributions 
therefore may be depressed due to the imposed comparison institution rather than the 
comparative information per se. This anomaly requires further research to understand 
the mechanism depressing contributions in C2.    
 
The ICS was successful in raising aggregate contributions close to efficient levels. 
This mechanism primarily works by motivating losing teams to contribute more. For 
best results though, parameters should be set so that the marginal return from 
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